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Introduction
In this paper we present a theory of health investment under competing mortality risks. The paper is motivated by Dow, Philipson and Sala-i-Martin (1999) in which they rejected the common notion that any cause-speci¯c intervention is wasteful because dying from other causes is \just around the corner." They argued that, since one dies at whichever cause that strikes rst, the actual length of life is the Leontief function of cause-speci¯c lengths of life. A cause-speci¯c intervention would be wasteful unless other causes of death are also dealt with. Hence, there is a tendency to equalize the occurrence of the causes, which in turns implies a spillover e®ect of a causespeci¯c intervention upon other cause-speci¯c interventions.
Unfortunately, the \equalizing occurrences" argument does not extend to the case when the lifetime is uncertain even though the argument is impeccable in the certainty case. To see it, we consider a simple case in which the risk of dying from each cause is exponentially distributed. In this case, the overall life expectancy is the reciprocal of the sum of cause-speci¯c hazard rates, not the Leontief function of cause-speci¯c life expectancies. Two more examples, including Weibull distributions, are given in the text to stress this point. On the other hand, we think it is plausible and intuitively appealing that di®erent types of preventive care are complements. The question is if and when the claim is valid. This is the objective of the paper.
A reduction in the price of a cause-speci¯c preventive care would imply an increase in all types of preventive care if they were complements to one another and satis¯ed the law of demand. While one is made richer by a 1 lowered price, it is not necessarily true that the increased wealth can a®ord all these additional preventive cares. If the increased wealth falls short, then the increase in longevity derived from more health investment in all causes is at the expense of the quality of life because the resources available for consumption are reduced. The observation suggests that we would need a strong quantity-of-life e®ect if the spillover e®ect were valid.
To this end, let us treat the overall life expectancy as a production function of cause-speci¯c preventive cares. One of the conditions we need is that any two types of preventive care are complements in production. We show that, if this complementarity dominates all other second-order e®ects put together, then di®erent types of preventive care are net complements. Other e®ects include the complementarity in utility between wealth and longevity, the diminishing marginal utility of longevity, and that of wealth. Interestingly enough, the same set of conditions is su±cient for all types of preventive care to be normal goods and, therefore, gross complements to one another.
We also show that, more risk averse people, as measured by Arrow-Pratt's relative risk aversion, will invest more in each cause-speci¯c prevention under the same set of conditions.
On the other hand, if the proposed \strong complementarity" were not true for certain types of preventive care, then some cause-speci¯c preventive care may not be a normal good and the corresponding substitution matrix may have some non-negative entries. In other words, some of them may be net substitutes to one another, which makes gross substitutability among them a possibility.
As for the optimal investment rules, we show that the marginal rate of 2 technical substitution (of prolonging life) between any two types of preventive care must equal their relative price. As an illustration, if each cause-speci¯c risk has a Weibull distribution and if the hazard rate is inversely proportional to the amount of preventive care, then the overall life expectancy is a CES production function of cause-speci¯c preventions. In the special case of exponential distributions, resources are so allocated that the medical expenditure-hazard rate ratio is constant across all causes. It is interesting to note that if the \equilibrium" marginal valuation of life were exogenously given, then the optimal health investment under competing risks also maximizes the net value of life.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we set up the model. In section 3, we employ the standard results from the literature of competing risks to refute the argument of equalizing occurrences. In section 4, we present our theory implications. In section 5, we draw some concluding remarks.
The Model
Let ¿ i , i = 1; 2; :::; n; be the random variable representing the age of death due to cause i if cause i is the only risk present. The hazard rates associated with these random variables are known as the net hazard rates. Since one dies only once, the actual length of life is the random variable ¿ = min f¿ 1 ; ¿ 2 ; :::; ¿ n g :
To make the model tractable, we assume that both the market interest rate and the subjective discount rate are zero and that the period utility function 3 is stable over time, i.e., u t (c) = u (c) for all t¸0: Furthermore, we assume that u (c) is strictly increasing and strictly concave in c, satisfying u (0)¸0 and u 0 (0) = lim x!0 u 0 (x) = 1. Given initial wealth W , the consumer maximizes the expected lifetime utility, E 0 R ¿ 0 u (c (t)) dt; subject to the lifetime budget constraint
Let F (t) be the distribution function of ¿ with density f (t) ; i.e., F (t)
represents the probability of dying before or at age t. Then the survival function is
satisfying S (1) = 0 1 and, if S (t) is integrable,
By de¯nition, ¿ is the life expectancy. Then the problem is transformed into max c(t)
It is obvious that the optimal consumption is c (t) = W=¿; and the indirect utility function of (3) is
1 We assume that the life-span lies in the interval [0; 1) instead of [0; T ¤ ] for some maximal life-span T ¤ : The analysis and the results remain unchanged. We choose 1 so that statistical distributions such as exponential and Weibull distributions can be directly applied. Furthermore, as pointed out in Chang (1991), S (t) acts like a discount factor in (3) and the budget equation (2) presumes the annuity market is perfect in the sense that the expected (present) value of lifetime consumption is equal to the initial wealth
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The strict monotonicity and the strict concavity of u (c) implies
i.e., wealth and longevity are complements in utility, and,
i.e., there is a diminishing marginal utility of longevity.
Now suppose the random age of death due to cause i, ¿ i , can be changed
i (x i ) > 0 in the sense that ¿ i is increased for any realization. In so doing, we endogenize the hazard rates and hence we may consider this health investment a form of self-protection of Erhlich and Becker (1973) . Following Kenkel (1994), we call this type of activities that change the probability of survival preventive medical care. It is to be distinguished from the type of health investment that changes health stocks but not survival probabilities. See, for example, Chang (1996) .
Under uncertain lifetimes, the actual length of life with preventive care (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x n ) is de¯ned by ¿ (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x n ) = min f¿ 1 (x 1 ) ; ¿ 2 (x 2 ) ; :::; ¿ n (x n )g : Again, ¿ (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x n ) is a random variable. Let ¿ (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x n ) = E [¿ (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x n )] be the overall life expectancy. We can regard ¿ (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x n ) as a production function with input vector (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x n ) because an increase in x i delays the cause-speci¯c age of death ¿ i (x i ) for any realization, which in turns raises the overall life expectancy ¿ . In short,
Given investment (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x n ), the consumer's wealth is reduced to W ¡ P n i=1 p i x i . Hence, the problem of preventive care can be formulated as
The model is germane to the stochastic model of Dow et al (1999) . However, we disagree with their claim that, because of its similarity to the certainty case, \the forces towards the equalization of cause-speci¯c lifetimes operate in the more general case as well." (p.1361.)
To ensure the solution to Problem (5) uniquely exists, we assume that the objective function V (W ¡ P n i=1 p i x i ; ¿ (x 1 ; :::; x n )) is strictly concave in (x 1 ; :::; x n ). In particular, the Hessian matrix, H = [h ij ] n£n ; is negative de¯nite, where
To ensure x i > 0 for all i, we further assume ¿ i (x 1 ; :::;
i.e., the consumer will not spend all her resources on preventive cares. Then the unique solution to problem (5) is interior. . Let h i (t) dt be the probability of dying from cause i in time interval (t; t + dt) ; in the presence of all risks, conditional on alive at time t: We assume the probability of more than one failure in (t; t + dt) is of order (dt)
2 : This h i (t) is known as the (instantaneous) crude hazard rate.
Then the overall crude hazard rate satis¯es the additivity property:
It shows that the force of mortality is the sum of components.
It is standard in the competing risks literature to assume that all causes of mortality are independent. If all risks are mutually independent, then h i (t) is also the net hazard rate.
In this case, crude hazard rates and net hazard rates are interchangeable.
Then, the survival function for cause i is S i (t) = exp f¡h i (t)g ; and the overall survival function is S (t) = exp f¡ P n i=1 h i (t)g. To illustrate, we¯rst assume that each cause-speci¯c survival function is 2 The heuristic argument goes as follows. Assume that one may die from disease 1, disease 2, or disease 1 and 2 simultaneously. Let¸i be the hazard rate of disease i; i = 1; 2; and¸1 2 be the hazard rate of disease 1 and 2 simultaneously. The intuition is this: We can treat dying from disease 1 and 2 simultaneously as if it were another disease independent of the other two. In other words, we are dealing with three independent risks. By induction, the argument applies to the case of multiple causes with dependency.
exponential with parameter¸i > 0, S i (t) = exp f¡¸itg ;¸i > 0; t > 0:
Then the overall survival function of ¿ = min f¿ 1 ; :::; ¿ n g is also exponential,
See
(Note that we reserve the notation ¿ i for @¿=@x i .) Then, the overall life expectancy in the presence of competing causes of death is
Next, we assume each cause-speci¯c risk has a Weibull distribution, i.e., the survival function is
Obviously, a Weibull distribution is reduced to an exponential distribution when ½ = 1. Then the overall survival function of ¿ = min f¿ 1 ; :::; ¿ n g is also of Weibull form,
A direct computation shows that
where
is the gamma function.
Third, assume each cause-speci¯c hazard rate is quadratic in time, i.e.,
Obviously, when ® i = 0; for all i, we have the exponential model. Then the overall survival function of ¿ = min f¿ 1 ; :::; ¿ n g is also quadratic in time
A direct computation shows that, if ® > 0,
is the standard normal function.
These examples present a challenge to Dow et al 's \equalizing occurrences" argument. Their intuition is built upon the certainty case of (1) ; T = min fT 1 ; T 2 ; :::; T n g ; where T i is the age of death due to cause i; i = 1; 2; :::; n: Since one dies only once, this Leontief function implies that a typical consumer will allocate resources so as to equalize the occurrence of causes. While the stochastic length of life takes the form of a Leontief function as shown in (1), the overall life expectancy as shown in (7), (8) and (9), do not.
More can be said about the overall life expectancy when each cause of death is exponentially distributed. First, equalizing the life expectancies of all causes of death is not a necessary condition to achieving a given life expectancy. This can be seen from
using (7) : In fact, the Leontief function of cause-speci¯c life expectancies overestimates the true life expectancy under competing risks.
Second, the e®ect of a cause-speci¯c intervention on life expectancy, and hence on lifetime utility, depends on the number of causes and the \weight" of a given cause relative to all causes,¸i= P n i=1¸i . Speci¯cally, the elasticity of life expectancy with respect to lowering i-th hazard rate is
An immediate corollary is that, for a given rate of hazard reduction, the cause with a larger share has a greater e®ect of intervention. In other words, among all causes of death, an intervention on the deadliest cause has the greatest impact on survival. When the number of causes, n; is large, the elasticity tends to be small, other things being equal. The theory thus predicts that, in the absence of an abnormally large hazard rate, the e®ect of cause-speci¯c intervention in disease-plagued countries would not be very successful at least initially.
4 Theory Implications
Resource Allocation
The¯rst-order conditions of (5) are 
It follows that ¿ i (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x n ) ¿ j (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::;
Since ¿ (x 1 ; :::; x n ) is a production function with input vector (x 1 ; :::; x n ), equation (13) ¿ (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x n ) = (1=½) ¡ (1=½)
11 is a CES production function with the elasticity of substitution 1= (1 + ½) · 1. Moreover, from (13) ; the optimal investment rules are
i.e., the cause-speci¯c medical expenditure is positively related to its hazard rate in equilibrium. In particular, when ½ = 1; (when the distribution is reduced to exponential), resources are so allocated that the ratio of medical expenditure, p i x i ; to hazard rate,¸i (x i ) ; is constant across all causes.
Equation (12) 
In other words, given the equilibrium marginal valuation of life, optimal health investment under mortality risks also maximizes the net value of life.
12

Wealth E®ect
From (11), the wealth e®ect is given by 2 6 6 4
As shown earlier, V W W < 0 and This mathematical result on the inverse matrix will become useful later.
To make use of it, we note that if C ij is the (i; j) ¡cofactor of [h ij ], then
Hence, for all i and j, C ji and det [h ij ] are opposite in sign.
Notice that every term in (6), except V ¿ ¿ ij , is negative. A necessary condition for h ij¸0 is that ¿ ij > 0, i.e., inputs x i and x j are complements in 3 It should be mentioned that comparative statics results can also be obtained using supermodularity approach. See, Topkis (1998, Theorem 2.8.2). Monotone comparative statics (@x i =@W¸0; 8i) holds if the objective function of (5) is supermodular in (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x n ; W ), which translates into h ij¸0 ; 8i 6 = j; and ¡V W W p i + V ¿W ¿ i¸0 ; ; 8i.
production. For example, if each cause-speci¯c risk has a Weibull distribution and if the hazard rate is inversely proportional to its investment, then, from (14), we have ¿ i > 0 and ¿ ij > 0. A su±cient condition for h ij¸0 is that the term V ¿ ¿ ij must dominate all other negative terms in h ij . The strength of this quantity-of-life e®ect and the feasibility of h ij¸0 ; 8i 6 = j; will be discussed later.
Price E®ect
From (11), the price e®ect is given by 2 6 6 4
V W e j ¡ x j 2 6 6 4
;
where e j is the column vector with 1 in the j-th row and 0 elsewhere. Then the Slutsky equations are given by
The¯rst term on the right-hand-side of (16) is the substitution e®ect and the second term is the wealth e®ect.
Proposition 2 If h ij¸0 ; 8i 6 = j, then all x 0 i s obey the law of demand (@x i =@p i < 0; 8i) and any two x 0 i s are gross complements (@x i =@p j < 0; 8i 6 = j).
The proposition is again a corollary of the theory of dominant diagonal matrices. As mentioned before, for all i and j, C ji and det [h ij ] are opposite in sign if h ij¸0 ; 8i 6 = j. Hence, all entries of the substitution matrix are negative. When i = j, the substitution e®ect of (16) is a net substitute to x j and, from (15), the wealth e®ect is ambiguous. Even if x i remains a normal good, it is still possible that the substitution e®ect dominates the wealth e®ect and, consequently, x i becomes a gross substitute to x j . In short, if the quantity-of-life e®ect as represented by ¿ ij > 0 is not large enough for some i and j, then the claim of a spillover e®ect could be false.
Risk Aversion
Consider u (x) = x 1¡® ; 0 < ® < 1: The parameter ® is Arrow-Pratt's relative risk aversion. Then
The¯rst-order conditions are
Then 2 6 6 4
Proposition 3 If h ij¸0 ; 8i 6 = j, then @x i =@® > 0 for all i.
Again, the proposition follows immediately from the fact that [h ij ] ¡1 has only negative entries. We thus conclude that more risk averse people will invest more in preventive cares.
On Feasibility
As mentioned before, the cross e®ect on longevity, V ¿ ¿ ij , must be large enough to ensure h ij¸0 ; 8i 6 = j. To illustrate the strength of this e®ect, we assume that u (x) = x 1¡® ; 0 < ® < 1 and that each ¿ i is exponentially distributed. Then ¿ (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::;
16 Any health investment that prolongs life is the health investment that reduces the corresponding hazard rate, i.e.,¸0 i (x i ) < 0. [Note that we did not assume the special functional form¸i (x i ) = a i =x i here.] If each¸i (x i ) is twice continuously di®erentiable in x i , then ¿ (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x n ) is twice continuously di®erentiable in (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x n ). In particular, we have
and
Clearly, ¿ ij > 0 if j 6 = i. Since ¿ (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x n ) is treated as a production function, we shall assume it is a concave function and, in particular, ¿ ii < 0.
Then equation (13) can be written as
From (17),
Then g ij > 0 is feasible. For example, if j(W ¡ P n i=1 p i x i ) (¿=b)j¸1 + p 2, then g ij > 0; since 0 < (1 ¡ ®) = (1 + ®) < 1:
The condition j(W ¡ P n i=1 p i x i ) (¿=b)j > 1 + p 2 is quite feasible. Since W ¡ P n i=1 p i x i > 0 represents the wealth for lifetime consumption, which is not small. The same is true for life expectancy ¿ . The absolute value of (W ¡ P n i=1 p i x i ) (¿ =b) < 0 will be large if jbj is relatively small. To ensure jbj is bounded from above, we need¯¸0 i (x i )¯is bounded away from zero for all i. Given ¿ ii < 0; it is necessary that, from (18) ;¸0 0 i (x i ) > 0. That is,¸i (x i ) is downward sloping and convex to the origin in the (x i ;¸i)-plane. Since the consumer spends only a portion of her resources in preventive care, x i is bounded and, hence,¯¸0 i (x i )¯is bounded away from zero.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we show that, if cause-speci¯c preventive cares are complements in utility, then they are normal goods, gross complements to one another, and have a positive risk aversion e®ect. We point out that, with uncertain lifetimes, the driving force behind the spillover e®ect is the strong complementarity in production that generates life expectancy, not the argument of equalizing the occurrence of di®erent causes of death. Without this strong complementarity in production, we show that net or even gross substitutes among some of them, and hence the failure of the spillover e®ect, are quite likely. In this sense our theory extends Dow, Philipson and Sala-i-Martin's theory and complements their empirical¯ndings.
